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Changes in Turkey Contracting, 
1967-1968 
by 
V. James Rhodes 
This study is about Missouri turkey 
raisers, what happened to them between 1967 
and 1968- and some changes in 1969. 
Turkey production and marketing is a 
clear example of the large-scale effic iency of 
modern agriculture. Large agribusiness firms 
vertical ly integrated in Missouri with a few 
hundred growers produ e and market millions 
of turkeys, making Missouri the fourth largest 
producer of turkeys. But our purpose here is 
more than to point with pride at an important 
industry. It is co ncerned with the people on 
the land w ho brood and grow turkeys and 
w ith the eco nomic consequences to th m of 
a rapidly chang ing turkey industry. 
This is the second study with the 87 pro-
du cers described in a previo u s publi ation, 
Contract Production of Turkeys, Missouri Station 
Bulletin 879. These producers were re-inter-
viewed in November and D ece mber , 1968, 
one production season later th an their first 
interviews in early spring of 1968. Sampling 
procedures were described in Bulletin 879. 
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Contracting Changes, 1967-68 
There was a major change in the number of producers 
from 1967 to 1968. Of the 87 producers in 1967, 22 did not 
produce turkeys in 1968. 
The proportions of contractees and independent producers 
remained almost unchanged-86.2 percent contractees in 1968 
compared to 85 percent in 1967. Five independents turned to 
contracting while three contractors became independent (Fig-
Figure 1 
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TABLE 1 
Types of Turkey Contracts 1967-68 
Percentage Types* 
1967 1968 
84 84 
7 10 
3 0 
6 3 
0 3 
100 100 
1. Production payment. 
II. Floor price (floor 
price with profit 
share, firm purchase). 
III. Financing (tied to feed 
or markets). 
IV .. Marketing. 
V. Profit share. 
* Number of contracts slightly exceeds number of producers 
because of multiple contracting. One producer, for example, 
had two piece wage contracts and two floor price contracts 
involving four different contractors. For this table, two 
"types" are counted, although there were four contracts. 
However, six contracts.in 1967 and two in 1968 were ex-
cluded from these totals because it was impossible to deter-
mine what type they were. 
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ure 1) . These three had contracted in 1967 with a company 
which made a major cut-back in contracting in 1968 as a re-
sult of losses in 1967. 
Risk-sharing by the contractor was almost universal in 
1968, involving 97 percent of all contracts compared to 91 
percent in 1967. Also, changes in the general proportions of 
panicular types of contracts-production payment, floor price, 
etc.-were small (Table 1). 
"A fundamental distinction between types of contracts is 
whether they do or do not transfer some risks to other par-
ties. It is also imponant to distinguish between two types of 
risks-production and market price." 
Production risks refer to those risks and uncertainties in 
the production process that relate to feeding efficiency, mor-
tality, and general health and quality of the birds. 
Market price risks refer to those risks and uncertainties 
associated with variations in market prices of finished turkeys. 
The following classification of contracts centered 
upon the nature of risk-sharing and also introduces other 
distinctions. 1 
I. Production Payment Contract 
"This type of contract shares production 
risks between grower and contractor (feed 
company or processor or both), but the con-
tractor takes all of the market price risk for 
the birds contracted because the contractor 
owns the birds. 2" 
The production payment is a piece wage for output ac-
complished. The contractor pays the producer so much per 
pound for turkeys marketed. This payment may include in-
centives for other aspects of performance such as mortality 
and fe~ efficiency. In another form of this type contract, the 
size of the per pound payment is related to the costs of pro-
duction for a flock as compared to average costs of all com-
parable flocks owned by that contractor. 
II. Floor Price Contract 
The grower owns the birds, takes all of the production 
risks and shares the price risks with the contractor. In turn, 
the contractor guarantees to purchase the birds at either a 
price which is no lower than a fixed minimum (floor) or at 
a schedule of prices related to market prices. In the usual 
case, the grower trades part of his potential profit if market 
prices are high for a guaranteed floor price if they are low. 
III. Financing Contract 
The grower owns the birds and takes all production and 
price risks. However, in return for contractor . financing of 
turkey production, the grower agrees to buy the contractor's 
feed and/ or to sell the finished birds to the contractor. 
IV. Marketing Contract 
"A marketing agreement constitutes an agreement 
of a processor to market a grower's birds and to return 
to him the net proceeds above processing, storage and 
other costs. Such an agreement is equivalent to a forward 
sale at an undetermined price. It insures a market for an 
otherwise independent grower, and it likewise schedules 
processing business for the processor. These purely mar-
keting agreements should not be confused with floor 
price contracts which are often tided marketing agree-
ments."3 
V. Profit Share Contract 
There is great variety of definitions of profits, risks, and 
management. Generally, the producer supplies land, equip-
ment and labor while the contractor furnishes the rest. 
Contracting Comparisons 
1967-1968 
Most contractees retained the same type contract in 1968 
that they had in 1967. Of 46 producers with classifiable con-
tracts both years, 36 kept the same type, three switched from 
one type to another and seven with multiple contracts made 
partial shifts in contract type. This kind of stability of types 
is not suprising in view of the predominance of the piece 
wage type in both years. 
Contracting is still rather unbusiness like. Of the 30 con-
tractees, only 25 had a copy of the contract in their posses-
sion. Seventeen reported verbal agreements. Most of the 
other 14 had apparently signed a contract with all copies re-
tained by the contractor's representative. It's difficult to imag-
ine such a method of doing business. It may reflect a con-
tractee's disinterest in having a copy. At other times, it reflects 
a producer's lack of bargaining power and a reluctance on 
the part of contractors to supply a copy to the contractee. A 
verbatim comment of a small producer (10,000 birds) tells 
the latter story. "I only got a short look at the contract. The 
fieldman said he only had one and I gave it back to him, but 
thought that he'd bring another, but he never did." 
Contracts were reported with 14 different contractors. 
There were six contractees who reported 1968 contracts in-
volving more than one contractor. Two companies (with 16 
and 11, respectively) had the largest number of contractees 
in the sample. Their total birds in the sample were 732,000 
or 52 percent of total contract birds and their average flock 
size was 27,100. 
The diversity of contracts greatly complicates classifica-
tion. There were usually different types of contracts for brood-
ing and growing. Moreover, some of the contractors had one 
or two variants from their usual contracts. There were 46 
piece wage contracts4 in 1968 but only 25 were entirely piece 
wage (Table 1) . In addition, 10 had a profit share clause, al-
though returns were usually too low to make it operative. 
Then there were four piece wage contracts which specified a 
slight connection between feed conversion dimensions and mar-
ket price, so the contractee had a very tiny share of the price 
risk. 
There were nine floor price contracts, (including four 
firm purchase), and two profit share. Firm purchaseS is 
classified as a variant of the floor price contract. A price scale 
is guaranteed by the contractor and linked to the price of feed. 
The contractee with a firm purchase contract, as with a floor 
price, has all the production risk; however, the contractee 
has no price risk with a firm purchase contract, whereas he 
ordinarily has some price risk with the floor price contract. In 
both cases, the contractee owns the birds. A profit share con-
tract is somewhere between a risk-sharing contract and inde-
pendence. Both these contracts were with a small contractor 
and he apparently retained ownership of one flock and fi-
nanced the other. 
One of the concerns about contracting as a replacement 
for the free market is the extent to which the producer can 
achieve any genuine competition among contractors for his 
services. One indication of such competition could be the 
amount of switching between contractors. Such a measure has 
some important defects, because switching can be influenced 
by several factors other than competition among contractors. 
How much switching was there among contractors be-
tween 1967 and 1968? There were 49 contractees who con-
tracted both years and who furnished enough information 
to clearly identify their contractors both years. Thirty-five of 
these 49 stayed with the same contractor; eight switched com-
pletely, and the other six made partial switches. This is a 
sizable amount of switching, but mainly reflects the large cut-
back of one major contracting firm in southwest Missouri. 
Most other contractors had almost exactly the same total 
number of contracts both years, with the exception of a rela-
tively large gain by one firm. Thus, much of the switching 
was involuntary on the part of growers and it is not evidence 
of active competition among contractors for growers. 
Changes in Volume Produced 
Missouri turkey production declined by 21.3 percent from 
11,473,000 in 1967 to 9,033,000 in 1968, while U.S. production 
declined by only 16 percent in the same period. This sample 
indicates that most of the reduction in Missouri turkey pro-
duction from 1967 to 1968 was by exits or dropouts in 1968 (Ta-
ble 2). Within this sample, 79 percent of the net reduction in 
production was attributed to the drop-outs. Of the 65 pro-
ducers, 15 increased production, 31 cut production and 19 
maintained production at the same level in 1968 and 1967. 
(A change of less than 10 percent was counted as maintain-
ing production). Consequently, average size of production for 
those producing in both years declined only slightly, except a 
larger drop for the contractee brooder-growers (Table 3). 
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These declines, however, interrupt a rather persistent annual 
growth in average size in recent years. 
Since this is a repeat study of the 1967 producers, infor-
mation is not available on how many turkeys were produced 
in 1968 by "new" producers who had not produced in 1967. 
Since the sample production fell 29.1 percent while state pro-
duction fell 21.3 percent, it seems likely that some of the 
difference is due to the production of new producers, or the 
change in the direct production of contractors or the large 
independent operators not included in the sample. 
The 1968 Drop-Outs 
In the turkey industry as in any industry, the important 
questions about exits are: Who left? Why? Where did they 
go? Is the exit permanent? 
Who left? In March 1968, 22 producers planned not to 
produce. Nineteen of these 22 did exit. There were three 
others who dropped out, although they had planned to pro-
duce in 1968. These 22 included two independents and 20 
with contracts. The 20 contracts in 1967 included 18 of the 
production payment type, one finance and one floor price. 
The producers who quit production were much like other 
producers as to size of operation, years of experience in pro-
duction, and average age. The 22 exits included four who 
only brooded turkeys, two brooder-growers and 16 growers. 
The brooders ranged in size from 1,000 to 40,000 and averaged 
21,590 compared to an average size in 1967 of 19,100 for all 
other growers. These 22 producers averaged the same age as 
all 87 producers-47 years of age in 1968-with a range in 
age of 27 to 62. Their first year of raising turkeys ranged from 
1945 to 1967 with 1964 being the median (middle) year, 
which was also the median for all producers in 1967. Nine of 
the 22 had raised turkeys only one or two years. 
Why did they leave? A 25.3 percent (22 out of 87) exit 
rate 1967-68 seems quite high. The very poor returns asso-
ciated with the national excess production in 1967 presumably 
increased the "normal" rate of exit. The rate may be larger 
in this sample than for the state as a whole because the exits 
were partially localized. For example, five out of six producers 
in Wright Counry and four out of nine in an adjacent county 
quit. Of the 20 contractees quitting, 10 had contracts in 1967 
with the contractor in southwest Missouri who drastically 
cut production in 1968 as a result of heavy financial losses in 
1967. 
Almost one-half (10 of 22) of the exits were "involun-
tary" in the sense that they couldn't obtain a contract or 
couldn't obtain enough birds. Six said they quit because of 
low returns, two because of dissatisfaction with contractor 
service, one because of poor health, and one sold his farm. 
What about the 1967 net returns in turkey production of 
the 22 who dropped out in 1968? The four brooders had posi-
tive returns; of the 18 growers and brooder-growers, three re-
ported negative net returns, 10 didn't report earnings, and five 
reported positive net returns. The unweighted average net re-
turn of those growers reporting was zero. 
Where did they go? Two thirds (actually 16 of 22) of 
the drop-outs have placed more emphasis upon other farm 
enterprises. Two were hauling feed for a turkey contractor, 
one retired, and three were in other nonfarm occupations. 
Contractors sometimes argue that Missouri turkey pro-
ducers can be tough bargainers because of good off-farm op-
portunities. This data suggests that off-farm opportunities 
were not very attractive for the producers. It is also argued . 
that other farm enterprises are an attractive alternative and 
give turkey producers bargaining power. While the above 
evidence suggests that other farm enterprises were the best 
alternatives of the drop-outs, it is well-known that turkey pro-
duction is concentrated in below-average income farming areas. 
Are the exits permanent? Exits can be temporary, but 
are more likely to be permanent. While the data is not com-
plete, it seems likely that only two of the 22 exits in 1968 
raised turkeys in 1969. The 1968 drop-outs were asked if they 
"planned" to raise turkeys in 1969 and also if they "would 
like" to raise turkeys in 1969. Thirteen "would like" to pro-
duce in 1969 including five who "planned" to produce. In 
August, 1969, 11 of the 13 who said they "would like" to 
grow turkeys in 1969 were again contracted. Only two of the 
eleven produced turkeys; they grew-out 23,400 on contracts; 
in 1967 they had produced 63,000. Two had sold their equip-
TABLE 2 
Turkey Production 7 1967 & 1968 in Sample 
Percent 
1967 1968 Change 
Contract growers 750,580 731,460 -2.5% 
Contractee brooder-growers 706,910 609,380 -13.8% 
Independent growers 32,700 29,140 -10.9% 
Independent brooder-growers 8 50,900 29,580 -2.6% 
Drop-outs, 1968 459,870 -100.0% 
2,000,960 1,419,560 -29.1% 
TABLE 3 
Average Size Producers 1967 & 1968 
Contract growers 
Independent growers 
Contractee brooder-growers 
Independent brooder-growers 
4 brooder drop-outs 
2 brooder-grower drop-outs 
16 grower drop-outs 
1967 
20,850 
6,540 
37,210 
12,720 
17,880 
21,450 
21,590 
1968 
20,320 
5,830 
32,070 
12,390 
ment, one had a building burn and one quit farming. Five of 
the other nine, who had indicated no desire to produce in 
1969, were interviewed by telephone. None of the five pro-
duced turkeys in 1969; one had sold his equipment and one 
had retired. 
More Exits Soon 
Corporations may exist in perpetuity; individual pro-
ducers cannot. The present producers will eventually be re-
placed by a new group. The 1968 producers were asked how 
many turkeys they planned to produce in 1969. Later, they 
were asked: "How many more years do you want to raise tur-
keys?" Twelve producers (eight contractees and four indepen-
dents) said they planned no production in 1969. However, 
one of them was very undecided and said he "wanted" to 
raise turkeys one more year but disease problems might pre-
vent it. In addition, two producers were undecided and said 
they didn't "want" to raise turkeys again, although they ear-
lier said that they would produce in 1969. One was an inde-
pendent who wanted to quit but felt he must raise turkeys 
long enough to payoff his creditors (on turkeys). The other 
was an independent who was determined not to contract, and 
planned not to produce in 1969 unless he did well in 1968 
(he didn't have any financial settlement for 1968 yet at the 
time of the interview) . Thus, of 65, 11 producers seemed to 
have decided to quit while three more were quite undecided 
about 1969. 
In August, 1969, contacts were made with 12 of these 
14 producers who had indicated in 1968 that they probably 
would not produce in 1969. Four, or one-third, did produce 
turkeys in 1969 while the other eight dropped out. Three in 
1967 and all four in 1968 were on contract. The four pro-
duced 84,000 birds in 1968 but only half that many in 
1969. Three of the four planned to produce in 1970. These 
eight producers ranged in age from 26 to 66 with a mean of 
49. Their first year of raising turkeys varied from 1942 to 1965, 
and four of them began in the 1940's. 
Producers' predictions of exit the following season were 
fairly accurate-19 of 22 in 1968 and eight of 12 in 1969. 
It remains to be seen whether exit predictions of a long 
term nature are as accurate. To the question "How many 
more years do you want to raise turkeys?", nineteen in 1968 
gave answers in the one to five year range, 19 gave answers in 
the six to 40 year range, and 14 gave indefinite answers. The 
number of Missouri producers will apparently continue to 
sharply decline unless there is substantial recruitment of new 
ones. The number might decline more than the turkey pop-
ulation. Also, contractors have investments they will protect 
by recruiting more growers. 
Gross and Net Returns to 
Producers 
Gross Returns. Gross returns to producers with produc-
tion payment contracts can be fairly accurately determined by 
interview, although such information is occasionally refused 
or garbled. Of the 13 brooding contracts on which we had 
returns in 1968, there were eight contracts that paid either 
19 1h or 20 cents a bird, two at 22 cents, and one at 23-the 
higher rates were normally earned for low mortality. There 
was a contract that returned 15 cents and another returned 
17 ~ cents. Thus, a brooder of 30,000 birds might have grossed 
about $6,000 in 1968. 
A return of 1.5 cents a pound, marketed weight, was the 
most common contract for grow-out. Among our 11 contracts, 
one extreme paid 3.0 cents (for toms in semi-confinement). 
The average return (unweighted) was 1.4 cents a pound. Thus, 
a grower of 30,000 birds might have grossed $8,400 in 1968. 
The average return (unweighted) for brooding and grow-
out was 2.4 cents a pound. The lowest return was 1.5 cents 
and the highest was 3.8 cents, but most of the 17 returns were 
in the 2.0 to 3.0 cent range. Thus, a brooder-grower of 30,000 
birds might have grossed about $14,400 in 1968. 
It should be emphasized that all of the gross returns 
given above were for production payment (usually piece wage) 
contracts only. Gross returns under such contracts are quite 
comparable among themsel'IICs, and are probably more useful 
than estimated net returns in evaluating contracts. Such gross 
returns are not comparable with those returns received by in-
dependent producers or those with floor price or marketing 
contracts. 
Gross returns for those with production payment con-
tracts were quite similar for 1967 and 1968. Most of the major 
contracts had only minor tightening in terms. A check of the 
gross receipts per bird brooded or per pound marketed for 18 
producers, who produced for the same contractors both years 
and furnished returns data both years, indicated no change in 
average gross returns per pound and only a few slight varia-
tions in individual gross returns . However, weighing was 
sometimes moved to the plant in 1968, thereby increasing 
shinkage and reducing total gross returns slightly. 
Gross returns for those growers who owned their turkeys 
(independents, marketing agreements, floor price contracts) 
probably increased about 2 cents a pound on the average 1967 
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to 1968, although individual changes varied considerably, and 
the data leave much to be desired. 
Net returns. Net returns are very difficult to estimate 
for any farm enterprise without a detailed analysis of good 
accounting records. Turkeys are no exception. The producers 
provided estimates of their operating expenses: fuel, electric-
ity, litter, other supplies, use of equipment, hired labor, and 
miscellaneous costs. Feed, poults, and medicines were also ex-
penses for those relatively few who took ownership of the 
birds. "Net returns" in this context were returns to family, 
operator labor, management, capital and land. These estimates 
for 1968 differed from 1967 estimates (Bul. 879) because: 
(1) the growers estimates of their own expenses were 
used this time rather than using standardized cost 
data from a previous record study as was done in 
1967, 
(2) depreciation and interest weren't counted as expenses this 
time. 
Net returns estimates were higher for 1968, but it appears 
that most of the difference was due to underestimation of 
1968 cOSts due to the above causes. One lesson is that pro-
ducers ought to keep better records and learn more about 
their own costs. 
It can be presumed that average net returns for 1968 and 
1967 were much the same for those with production payment 
contracts because of the similarity of average gross returns. 
The fact that producers would have much the same nets in 
the bad price year of 1967 and the somewhat better year of 
1968 emphasizes that the production payment contract is de-
signed to and does isolate the producer from price risk. 
Net returns were very likely improved in 1968 compared 
to 1967 for those growers who owned their turkeys (indepen-
dents, marketing agreements, floor price contracts). This result 
would follow from the higher gross returns already cited and 
the general stability of grower costs. The meager data on net 
returns also suPPOrt this conclusion, but no quantitative es-
timate is possible because of the data and measurement prob-
lems mentioned. It should be added that net returns were 
generally very bad for these growers in 1967, so that a sizable 
improvement for 1968 doesn't necessarily indicate any great 
prosperity in 1968. 
Types of Contracts, 1968 
Contracts are typically for one flock or a season. Of the 
56 contractees, only five had a contract for the 1969 season in 
November 1968. This lack of future assurance increases the 
risks of the producer, complicates his financing of buildings 
and equipment, and reduces stability in the industry. . 
The major elements of eight types of contracts used m 
1968 are summarized and classified to facilitate comparison. 
Each contract is indicated by a number-(I), (2), etc. While 
the major written contracts in use in the state are discussed, 
it isn't possible to discuss all written contracts nor to evaluate 
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oral agreements, nor to indicate individual variations of these 
eight contracts. 
A. Production Payment Type-day old to market-
contractor owns birds, furnishes feed and (usually) medicams. 
(1) a. base payment of 2¢ per pound of live turkey mar-
keted (passing government inspection) plus a feed conversion 
premium tied to a livability record. 
b. if 87 percent or better livability, then a 1O;.2¢ premium 
per turkey marketed for a feed conversion of 3.75 to 3.79 ris-
ing by 1;.2¢ steps to 36¢ for 2.90 and below. If livability is 
less than 87 percent, payment to grower will be reduced 2 
percent for each percentage point drop in livability below 87 
percent. A "standard performance" would pay 67¢ a bird or a 
flock total of $11,528 for 17,600 marketed birds. An "unusual-
ly bad performance" would pay 26.4¢ a bird or a flock total of 
$3,696 for 14,000 marketed birds. A "standard performance" is 
defined here, solely for purposes of comparability, as 92 per-
cent livability for brooding and 88 percent to market with a 
feed efficiency of 3.27 and a 20 pound flock average at market. 
A flock of 20,000 birds is assumed to be placed in the house. 
An "unusually bad performance" modifies the standard per-
formance by assuming that livability to market falls to 70 per-
cent because of disease, storms, predators, etc. A flock of 
20,000 poults is assumed to be placed in house but only 
14,000 are marketed. 
(2) a. base payment of 1O¢ per bird placed in house. 
b. payment of 7¢ per bird moved to range if 91 percent 
or less livability or 1¢ extra per bird for each percent livability 
above 91 percent, e.g., 10¢ for 94 percent livability. 
c. 10¢ per bird marketed. 
d. a livability premium varying from J..2¢ per bird for 91 
percent livability to 5¢ for 100 percent. 
e. feed efficiency premium based on a complicated scale 
of livability, selling price and feed efficiency. 
For example, for mixed flocks with livability of 90 per-
cent or above and selling price of 18 or 19 cents, the premium 
goes by 1¢ steps from 3¢ for 3.56-3.60 feed efficiency to 14 
cents for 3.01-3.05. Those same premiums are 2 cents less if 
selling price is below 18 cents and 2 cents more if price is 20 
or 21 cents. A livability record of 85 percent to 89 percent 
will reduce the premium by 5 cents and a livability record of 
80 percent to 84 percent will reduce the scale another 5 cents. 
A "standard performance" at an 18 or 19 cent selli.ng pr~ce 
would pay 33.7 cents a bird and at 20 or 21 cents sellmg pnce 
would pay 35.7 cent~, a bird or a flock total of $6,288 or 17,600 
marketed birds. An ("unusually bad performance" would pay 
34.8 cents a bird or a flock total of $4,872 on 14,000 marketed 
birds. 
(3) a. base payment of 4 cents per pound markete~ and 
passing government inspection. This payment can de~e to 
3;.2 cents or rise to 4J..2 cents, depending upon the relation of 
grower's flock cost of production to average costs o~ all s~­
ilar flocks of the contractor. A "standard performance at mm-
imum rate of 3;.2 cents would pay 70 cents a bird marketed 
or a flock total or $12,320. An "unusually bad performance" 
would pay 70 cents a bird which would yield a flock total of 
$9,800 on 14,000 birds marketed. 
(4) a. brooding payment of 191--2 cents per bird de-
livered to contractor or to range. This payment can fall to 
16 cents or rise above 191--2 cents depending upon the relation 
of brooder's flock costs of production to average costs of all 
similar flocks of the contractor. b. growing (range) payment 
of 11--2 cents a pound for all turkeys marketed and passing 
government inspection. A "standard performance" at average 
brooding costs would pay 50.4 cents per bird marketed or a 
flock total of $8,868. An "unusually bad performance" would 
pay 55.6 cents a bird or a flock total of $7,788. (5) a. pay-
ment for brooding of 18 cents a bird delivered to contractor 
or to range. b. 35 percent of "net profits" but not less than 
one cent per pound marketed. e. .01 cent premium per each 
.01 pound of feed saved under 3.25; .02 cent penalty per each 
.01 pound of feed consumed over 3.75. d. penalty of 1--2 cent 
per pound for failure to provide sufficient feeders and waterers. 
e. other minor penalties. A standard performance without any 
profits share above the one cent a pound would pay 38.8 cents 
a bird marketed or a flock total of $6,832. An "unusually bad 
performance" would pay 43.7 cents a bird or a flock total of 
$6,112. 
Comments: In the market place, economic alternatives can 
be compared quite accurately and usually quite simply. In a 
contractual economy, the alternatives become more compli-
cated. It is surprising that contracts with such differing gross 
returns can continue to co-exist (Table 4) . Either net returns 
are poorly correlated with gross returns, or competition among 
contractors is very limited, or producer knowledge about con-
tract alternatives is very poor. The dispersion is a bit smaller 
than it first appears because one contract was seldom used. 
Contract number 3, which was superior for both a standard 
and unusually bad performance, was seldom found in the 
sample-perhaps because the contractor found it to pay the 
producer too well. 
TABLE 4 
Total Gross Returns to Producers 
for a Beginning Flock of 20,000 Poults 
Various 
Production 
Payment 
Contracts 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
Standard Performance 
$11,528 
6,288 
12,320 
8,868 
6,832 
Unusually 
Bad 
Performance 
$3,696 
4,872 
9,800 
7,788 
6,112 
Contracts do differ considerably as to gross returns. Dif-
ferences in net returns mayor may not be as much depending 
upon the above or below-standard performance of the flock 
and upon other costs. Flock performance is affected by factors 
in addition to producer management. Feed efficiency can be 
affected by its quality and the extent to which late deliveries 
may leave birds without feed for a day or two. Mortality is 
related to the quality of poults, feed, and medicine and to the 
competence of the fieldman as well as to the management of 
the producer. However, it is believed that grower cOSts are 
generally quite similar. 
Producer knowledge of terms of other contracts was 
found, on the previous survey, to be rather limited (see Sta-
tion Bulletin 879). Even more significant in explaining the 
big variations in contract terms is the limited competition 
among contractors. There's no simple index for measuring 
such competition. But, the small number and the geographical 
dispersion of contractors, the interview with producers, the 
limited amount of voluntary producer shifting among con-
tractors, and the lack of bargaining power of most producers 
all point to limited competition among contractors. 
Contract number one may be ranked second to fifth by 
growers depending upon their performance expectations and 
attitudes toward risk. However, contract number 4 is superior 
on both performance counts to number 5 which, in turn, is 
superior on both counts to number 2. Contracts numbers 1,2 
and 4 were encountered most frequently in the 1968 survey. 
The production payment contract was defined earlier 
as sharing the productirm risks between producer and contractor. 
These five production payment contracts indicate the large 
variations in how these risks are shared. The producer's re-
turns are greatly affected by production results in contract 
1 but only slightly affected in contract 5. 
B. Floor price - day-old to market 
(6) a. payment of floor price of 211--2 cents a pound of live 
marketable turkey hens and 19 cents a pound for toms. 
b. the first two cents of any excess of market price over 
floor price goes to grower and half of any above two 
cents goes to grower. 
c. this payment, however, is subject to six cents a pound 
deduction for all pounds of "undergrade" turkeys. 
"Undergrade" is defined as any hens not Grade A and all 
toms in excess of 10 percent not Grade A. 
C. Firm Purchase - day old to market 
(7) a. grower (dealer) buys poults at 60 cents each. 
b. selling price is totally unrelated to market price. It is 
set in relation to feed price as billed to the producer by a 
complicated formula. 
For example, at feed price of $70.00 to $70.99 per ton, 
selling price of toms is 20.15 cents. For any change in 
feed price of $1.00 either way, the price of toms changed 
0.17 cents. Hens are priced 1.0 cent above toms. 
e. The Grade A base is 80.0 to 82.9 percent for toms and 
85 to 87.9 percent for hens. There is a .04 cent premium 
or penalty for each full percent the turkeys grade above 
or below this base. 
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D. Marketing Agreement - day-old to market 
(8) a. contractor agrees to dress, grade, pack, ship and mar-
ket all marketable turkeys up to a specified number. 
Grower owns turkeys and agrees to market such turkeys 
at certain approximate dates. 
b. contractor charges 7.40 cents a pound oven-ready 
weight on large turkeys and 8.15 cents per pound on 
smaller ones for all processing through first month's 
storage. 
Comments: It is difficult to visualize entirely comparable con-
dit ions in which these last three contracts might be com-
pared fairly with one another or with the production payment 
types. To the extent that some producers face both production 
uncertainty and lack of information on which to base price 
and cost estimates, then the production payment types may 
have particular appeal to them. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This follow-up study of the 1967 survey reported in 
Missouti Station Bulletin 879 describes some of the important 
changes in the situation of sample turkey producers in Mis-
souti from the low prices of 1967 to the somewhat better 
season of 1968. 
(1) Of the sample of 87 producers in 1967, 22 (or 25.3 
percent) did not produce in 1968. This exit rate was presum-
ably high because of the low turkey prices in 1967, and also 
the ensuing financial difficulties of one contractor who dras-
tically reduced operations in 1968. 
(2) Exit is often assumed to be due to inefficiency, but 
exit was more often due to inability to obtain a contract than 
to low grower earnings. Those quitting were similar to other 
producers as to size of operations, years in turkey production, 
and average age. 
(3) Sixteen of the 22 drop-outs began placing more em-
phasis upon other farm enterprises rather than taking non-
farm jobs or retiring. Only two of the 22 raised turkeys in 
1969, so their exit seems to be permanent. 
(4) At least eight more producers did not produce in 
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1969, so the turnover remains substantial. One of the justifi-
cations cited for contracts is greater industry stability, but 
stability for those who are producing has not been obtained. 
One of the important contributions to instability is the single 
season contract, which provides no long run assurances to the 
producer. Another is that returns were below expectations. 
(5) The percentage of contractees versus independents 
remained almost unchanged-86.2 percent contractees in 1968 
compared to 85 percent in 1967. 
(6) The percentage of contracts in which the contractor 
takes risks (price or production) rose to 97 percent from 91 
percent in 1967. Production payment contracts continued to 
be the dominant type at 84 percent of all contracts . Profit 
sharing clauses within various contracts became more num-
erous. Most producers kept the same type contract in 1968 as 
they had in 1967. 
(7) Contracts were reported with 14 different contractors, 
but half the birds were with twO contractors. Voluntary 
switching by producers among contractors was small-the 
opportunity was probably lacking. 
(8) A suprising diversity was found in potential retutns 
among various firms writing the same type contract-the pre-
dominant production payment type. Gross returns to a pro-
ducer starting with a flock of 20,000 poults under assumptions 
of "standard performance" ranged from $12,320 to 6,288. A 
fundamental problem with present contract practices is this 
tremendous variation in gross returns. Differences this large 
are not found in well-informed competitive markets. 
(9) Producers need better cost records and particularly 
better concepts of their annual cOSts of capital. They also 
need to become better informed as to contract alternatives and 
they need to find means to obtain more equitable retutns. 
(10) Gross and, probably, net returns to producers on 
production payment contracts averaged much the same for 
1967 and 1968. Gross and net returns to producers owning 
their birds and assuming price risks improved somewhat in 
1968. 
(11) The average number of turkeys produced fell slightly 
for those producers producing both years. However the total 
1968 production of the sample fell 29.1 percent-mainly be-
cause 25.3 percent of the producers dropped out. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Missouri Station Bulletin 879, p . 4. 
2. Missouri Station Bulletin 879, p. 4 
3. Missouri Station Bulletin, p. 6. 
4. There were a few more "contracts" than types of contracts for rea-
sons indicated in Table 2. 
5. See section, "Types of Contracts, 1968," for one version of a firm 
purchase contract. 
6. Producers who dealt with more than one contractor one or both 
years, and switched so that they did not deal with exactly the same 
set both years made a "partial switch." 
7. Poults brooded and poults grown-out are totaled together, so the 
totals exceed the number of birds marketed for processing. 
8. Also includes breeder-growers and a brooder-breeder enterprise. 
9. See a similar finding for broiler contracts of a few years ago in 
Arkansas. See The Broiler Industry, a Staff Report of the Packers 
and Stockyards Administration, USDA, August 1967. 
